1958]

COMMENTS

fer and time of death on stock transferred in contemplation of death should be
included in the transferor's estate for tax purposes. The Tax Court there held,
with four dissents, that small annual dividends of common stock, representing
a capitalization of current earnings, declared on common stock should be so
included. The court based its conclusion on the ground that the proportionate
interest in the corporation represented by the original shares had not changed;
the stock dividends were simply a readjustment of the number of shares expressing that interest. As a result, decedent's gross estate was valued for estate
tax purposes as if she had continued to own the original stock and the stock
dividends until death.
The Court of Appeal of England reached a contrary result in Attorney General
v. Oldham.s Under a statutory provision6 essentially similar to Section 2035(a),
the court reasoned that the dividend stock was given by the corporation rather
than the decedent and thus could not have been part of the original disposition.
The McGehee result appears preferable. Had the corporation declared a stock
split it would seem clear that the donor's gift should include the additional
stock. Otherwise the property that is brought back for tax purposes would
7
constitute only a fraction of what was originally given. The only real difference
between a stock split and a stock dividend is that the latter is given different
accounting treatment-a transfer from retained income to capital account of
an amount equal to the fair value of the additional shares." It is difficult to
see why the corporation's accounting treatment should affect what is considered
the "property transferred."'
The four dissenting judges in McGehee contended that since the dividends
were created out of retained income earned subsequent to the transfer they
0
were not part of the "property" passing under the original gift.' But the
6[1940]1 K.B. 599, aff'd [1940] 2 K.B. 485. See Inheritance Taxes-Stock Dividend Declared
and Paid after Inter Vivos Gift of Shares Held Exempt from Estate Duty on Donor's Death,
54 Harv. L. Rev. 512 (1941).
6Finance Act, [1894], §§ I, 2(1)(c); Customs and Inland Revenue Act, [1881], § 38(2),
as amended by Customs and Inland Revenue Act, [1889], § 11(1), and Finance Act, [1910],

§ 59(1).

7 See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
8The essential significance of this accounting requirement is "that the directors cannot,
without incurring personal liability, pay out in dividends a sum which infringes on the amount
designated as 'stated capital.'" Dewing, Corporation Securities 88 (1934). See also Company
Manual, New York Stock Exchange, §§ A14-A15 (1955), and Acc. Res. Bull. No. 11, (Rev.),

Committee on Accounting Procedure, American Institute of Accountants (1953).

9This reasoning would also seem to prevent the drawing of a distinction between a 100%

stock dividend and a 1% stock dividend, though it has been suggested that the smaller
distribution is analogous to "income." See Cohen, Surrey, Warren and Tarleau, A Technical
Revision of the Federal Income Tax Treatment of Corporate Distributions to Shareholders,

52 Col. L. Rev. 1, 11 n.36 (1952).

10The effect of the valuation-at-time-of-death rule would be greatly limited by the minority's approach since increased valuation due to current earnings would not be counted in
the decedent's estate if capitalized by a stock dividend. This is especially important since
most stock dividends are declared out of current earnings. Dewing, note 8 supra at 99.
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section taxing transfers in contemplation of death anticipates fluctuations in
value between the time of transfer and the date of death; it is the fair market
value at death, not at the time of gift, that is included in decedent's gross
estate."' If a corporation increases its net assets after a transfer and no stock
dividends are declared, this increase would presumably be reflected in the
market value of the stock originally transferred. The capitalization of this
increased value per share by a stock dividend is no reason for different tax
treatment.
Since income derived from transferred property is not brought back for
estate tax purposes, 2 it could be argued that those stock dividends which are
taxed as income under the 1954 Code should not be included in decedent's
gross estate. An examination of the present rules, however, indicates that this
position is undesirable. The income status of most stock dividends other than
common on common' 3 is determined by whether, within the shareholder's
lifetime, the dividend stock is sold or redeemed while the underlying stock
is retained. 14 It would seem inappropriate to determine the question of what
property the donor transferred by reference to the behavior of the donee.
Also, since estates are usually closed as quickly as possible, it would be impractical to have the estate's tax evaluation await a subsequent disposition of
dividend stock.
It has been suggested that the adoption by McGehee of the proportionate interest theory may raise difficulties similar to those previously encountered in the
income tax field. 5 The theory was first propounded in the leading case of
Eisner v. Macomber,1 where it was employed to determine whether stock
dividends should be included in the shareholder's taxable income. The Supreme
Court held that since a dividend of common on common, with no other class
n Treas. Reg. 105, § 81.10, U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News (1956).
Cf. Igleheart v. Commissioner, 77 F.2d 704 (C.A. 5th, 1935).
12Commissioner v. Estate of Gidwitz, 196 F.2d 813 (C.A. 7th, 1952); Estate of James
E. Frizzel, 9 T.C. 979 (1947), aff'd sub nom. Bums v. Commissioner, 177 F.2d 739 (C.A.
5th, 1949); Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1(e) (1956). Cf. Maass v. Higgins, 312 U.S.
443 (1941).
13 Int. Rev. Code § 306(c) (1) (A) (1954).

14 Int. Rev. Code §306 (1954).
'6Surrey and Warren, Comment on McGehee, CCH Federal Taxation-Current Law
and Practice 2628 (1957). For a full analysis of the proportionate interest theory and the
problems it created, see Magill, Taxable Income, c.2 (rev.ed., 1945); Alvord and Biegel,
Basis Provisions for Stock Dividends under the 1939 Revenue Act, 49 Yale L.J. 841 (1940);
Eichholz, The Revenue Act of 1939 and the Basis of Stock Dividends and Rights, 40 Col.L.Rev.
404 (1940); Lowndes, The Taxation of Stock Dividends and Stock Rights, 96 U. of Pa.
L.Rev. 147 (1947); Rottschaefer, Present Taxable Status of Stock Dividends in Federal Law,
28 Minn.L.Rev. 106, 163 (1944); Simons, Federal Tax Reform, 14 U. of Chi.L.Rev. 20,
47-54 (1946); Dean, The Stock Dividend, 32 Taxes 586 (1954); Kanter, The Present Taxable
Status of Stock Dividends, 31 Taxes 418 (1953).
16252 U.S. 189 (1920).
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of stock outstanding, failed to change the shareholder's proportionate interest
in the corporation, no income was received. 7 This test left the way open for
attempts at converting what might have been ordinary income into capital
gain through stock "bail-out" schemes which preserved the current proportionate interests in the corporation. 18 Some of the consequent stock dividend
plans became so complex and the test so refined that "in many cases it [was]
virtually impossible to ascertain the taxability of a stock dividend."' 19 As a
result, Congress eliminated the proportionate interest test 20 from the income
tax field in the 1954 Code. 21
However, it seems reasonable to conclude that the problems which the
proportionate interest theory brought before the courts in income tax litigation
will seldom arise in the estate tax field. There are relatively few instances in
which the question arises as to whether stock dividends should be brought
back into an estate for estate tax purposes. 22 Moreover, it is difficult to conceive
of any tax avoidance planning which would induce transferors to arrange for
stock dividends on shares transferred 3 In support of this conclusion it is
worth noting that McGehee was a case of first impression.
Nevertheless, the case does present problems. If stock rights are distributed
on shares transferred in contemplation of death, under the McGekee case the
proportionate interest test determines whether the rights should be brought
back for estate tax purposes,241 but it does not aid in evaluating what is brought
back. Suppose, for example, a corporation issued to its shareholders stock rights
17 Conversely, it was later held that dividends of preferred stock to common stockholders,
with both classes outstanding, constituted taxable income. Helvering v. Gowran, 302 U.S.
238 (1937).
18 Typically, the corporation would issue a non-taxable preferred stock dividend with the
understanding that it would soon be redeemed, enabling the shareholders to receive cash
at capital gains' rates. See Chamberlin v. Commissioner, 207 F.2d 462 (C.A. 6th, 1953).
19Report of the House Committee on Ways and Means on H.R. 8300, 83d Cong. 2d
Sess., 33-34 (1954).
20 Id., at A81.
21Present income tax treatment of stock dividends is governed by Int. Rev. Code §§ 305306 (1954).
22 In addition to gifts in contemplation of death, the issue of includibility arises under
the 1954 Code when shareholders transfer stock and retain some right "to designate the persons
who shall possess or enjoy" the stock transferred, Section 2036(a)(2); when the transferor
retains a reversionary interest in the stock transferred (to a third person or trust) which
"immediately before the death of the decedent exceeds 5 percent of the value" of the stock,
and "possession or enjoyment of the property can ... be obtained only by surviving the
decedent," Section 2037(a); and when the transfer is revocable, Section 2038(a).
"1Such tax planning would require: (1) a transfer in contemplation of death; (2) influence
with the corporation sufficient to have a stock dividend declared; (3) proportionate interests
altered by the dividend; (4) death of the transferor within three years of the gift. See Int.
Rev. Code § 2035(b) (1954).
24 Presumably, includibility of the rights would depend on the kind of stock covered by
the rights and the kind of stock with respect to which the rights were issued.
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enabling them to purchase for $30 stock then selling at $40. Suppose, further,
that on the date of the decedent's death the stock was worth $60. Assuming
proportionate interests have not been changed by this issue, the question arises
as to what amount should be included in the decedent's estate. The easiest
approach would be to bring back $30-the difference between the share's
value at the date of death and the amount needed to exercise the right-regardless of what the donee did with the stock right25 Support for this position
might be gained from the argument that the value of the property transferred
should not be determined by the behavior of the donee. However, such an
approach appears to be oversimplified. If a stock right was exercised immediately upon declaration it would seem preferable to have its $10 value at that
time brought back along with one-fourth of the $20 increase in value of the
share purchased. The one-fourth of $20 represents the amount of the gain
earned by the stock right; three-fourths represents the amount earned by the
donee's investment. If the stock right was not exercised immediately, its value
and the ratio between its value and the amount invested by the donee might
change but the same rule should apply. It would be inequitable to include
in the decedent's estate for tax purposes that portion of the increased value
of the share in no way attributable to the "property transferred."26 On the
other hand, if the stock right was not exercised and did not expire, the estate
should include the full $30 as the donee has made no investment. And, it
follows that if the right had expired nothing can be brought back since the right
would have no value at time of death.
Another problem concerns the question of whether the proportionate interest
test is an adequate tool when applied to preferred on common, a popular form
of dividend. If only common stock is outstanding, it is clear that proportionate
7
interests are not changed. Yet the usual preferred stock protection provisions
often given the common shareholder security he did not have before. And it
is difficult to see how the decedent can be deemed to have transferred an
interest not represented by the shares actually given. Perhaps a better approach
would be to consider, in addition to the proportionate interest test, whether
a new kind of interest was received by the donee.2 8 Such a test, however, might
introduce added complexity and vagueness which it would be better to avoid
by undeviating application of the proportionate interest test.2 9
25Cf.

Bensel v. Commissioner, 36 B.T.A. 246 (1937).

26 Cf. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1(e) (1956) (The value of additions and betterments
to property by the transferee is not included in the transferor's gross estate for tax purposes.).
27 Graham and Dodd, Security Analysis 309-313 (1951).

28 See

Koshland v. Helvering, 298 U.S. 441 (1936).

29 See

Strassburger v. Commissioner, 124 F.2d 315 (C.A. 2d, 1941).

